Tag: tactics

Route Two Soccer: Why the US Can’t Figure Out How to Break Down a Bunker

Posted on by RJ Allen

Why does the United States Women’s National Team struggle to break down compact, deep defensive teams?

In many ways, this has been the defining question of the two years since the US crashed out of the Olympics after failing to pick apart a very defensive Sweden. Hope Solo called them “a bunch of cowards” for playing that way. But Sweden weren’t cowards; they were just being practical.

Return to the question: why does the US struggle to break down a defensive block? Because everyone does. That’s why teams do it.

Soccer is a game of inches, of low margins and tiny probabilities. The default is for teams to not score, and it takes something special to upset that balance. Good teams still win because they possess the talent necessary to make the difference, but it’s hardly a certainty. We’ve all seen games where one team dominates but simply can’t break through, thanks to a goalkeeper standing on their head. Or games where the dominant team hits the crossbar three or four times. Just a few inches in one direction and they’d have cruised to victory.

This is frustrating, but if you’re the better team, the best you can do is expand the number of good shots you generate, and rely on your talented players to convert some of the chances.

Conversely, for weaker teams, it can make a lot of sense to play a defensive style. By reducing the chances available to both teams, you’ll hurt your own odds of scoring. But you’ll hurt the odds of the other team more. Playing defensively doesn’t change the basic structure of the match: the superior team is still superior and remains the favorite. But it can change the odds. By cutting down on the number of chances, you reduce their ability to exploit that superiority to the fullest extent.

Not every defensive approach is the same. At the extreme, teams can put all eleven players behind the ball, retreating deep into their defensive quadrant. In a more limited form, they can employ the classic ‘two banks of four.’ And there are plenty of ‘defensive’ setups that don’t necessarily rely on a lot of deep numbers but instead look to clog up the middle. The popular 4-2-3-1 setup can be quite defensive if both holding midfield players are more destructive than creative.

These all pose slightly different tactical problems. But when people talk about ‘bunkers,’ they usually mean teams who set up at least two lines of deep defense, conceding much of the midfield into order to shorten the space between their lines. The goal is to create two walls of bodies that close off the elusive ‘pockets of space’ that soccer commentators so love to talk about.

This generally makes for tactics that resemble nothing so much as the siege of a fortified Medieval castle. The superior team will unleash plenty of shots, but usually from distance, or from poor angles. They’ll have space to maneuver 30 yards from goal, but will have trouble getting any closer. They’ll have plenty of room on the wings to send in crosses, but will rarely get a clean head on the ball when it comes in.

When this sort of defensive play works, it’s usually down to a combination of three factors: good execution by the weaker team, poor execution by the stronger team, and luck.

The missing element here, often the most critical factor in other matches, is tactics. That’s because the whole point of deep defensive blocks is their capacity to severely limit the number of tactical issues in a game. There is no special sauce, no secret ingredient, no tactical innovation that will ‘solve’ this problem. A deep defensive block eliminates most of the spaces that players want to poke into. It jams up all the locks that smart tactics are trying to pick. The whole point is to reduce the number of unknowns in a game, to prevent superior teams from exploiting a wide range of game states.

This doesn’t mean defensive blocks are unbeatable. Far from it. Good teams can beat them, and more often than not they do. But not because of any particularly innovative techniques. The solution to beating this approach is to do the obvious things, execute them, and wait for the weight of probability to turn one of your half-chances into a goal.

So what are the obvious things?

First, play good crossers on the wings and good headers up front. This is where a ‘classic number 9’ can be useful—a big, bruising player who can out jump and outmuscle the opposing defenders. Think Abby Wambach. But while a strong #9 is important here, the bigger element is simply having wide players capable of posing a serious threat. Defensive blocks are strongest when they’re narrow. The more dangers you can create from wide spaces, the more stretched the defensive lines will have to be, and the more opportunities you’ll find in the middle.

Second, press aggressively when you lose possession. Defensive lines work because they’re tight and controlled. In a true bunker, the weaker team will treat this solidity as paramount, and won’t even try to counter for fear of losing their shape. But very few teams play that way. And the more that the opponent tries to attack, the harder it will be for them to recover. That can be exploited.

Third, shoot from distance. Deep defensive teams will generally offer plenty of space from 30-35 yards out. Coming out to pressure the ball is risky, because it creates holes that can be exploited. But if you have players willing and able to unleash dangerous shots from that range, it makes holding the defensive lines much more difficult.

Fourth, work the ball quickly through tight spaces. No block is impermeable. There will always still be space, just less than usual. A player with exceptional skill on the ball or with superb passing agility will often be able to exploit the tiniest of opportunity. This isn’t easy, and will often result in losing the ball, but that’s a cost that must be paid.

These are all simple ideas, and usually, they’ll get the job done. A defender will make a mistake, get caught out of position, miss a crucial tackle, or lunge in and concede a penalty. Or they’ll just get unlucky. A deflected shot will go in, or a cleared ball will fall right to the feet of an attacker. Moreover, even if they execute perfectly, there will still be half-chances. High-quality finishers aren’t guaranteed to convert those chances, but more often than not, one will eventually fall.

But probability isn’t certainty. Sometimes the chances just don’t fall. And when that happens, there can be a temptation to say that the coach needs to try something else. Unfortunately, the simple reality is that there aren’t really any other options. You just have to keep plugging away, putting the defensive team under pressure, and forcing them to execute.

None of this is to say that coaching has no role to play here. In a game of small margins, every opportunity to exploit an advantage needs to be taken. Good coaches will prepare for defensive teams by working on set pieces, by developing setups that will be capable of exploiting wide spaces, by emphasizing the importance of quick ball movement. They’ll be willing to adapt their approach. Perhaps they’ll bring on a big physical number 9 who normally wouldn’t start. Perhaps they’ll shift to a 442 which allows them to get four wide attackers involved without losing numbers in the middle. And so on.

Of course, it’s always worth looking for improvements in these margins. But marginal improvements are the best that can ever really be hoped for. At the end of the day, these games are usually determined by execution, not tactics.

 

Route Two Soccer – Players Out of Position

Posted on by RJ Allen

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How many players have natural positions? How flexible are those roles? In what circumstances does it make sense to play someone ‘out of position’? These are questions that most soccer fans will find themselves asking sooner or later, particularly if they follow teams coached by habitual tinkerers.

There are few better examples than Jill Ellis, head coach of the US Women’s National Team, who has spent the past few years persistently trying to fit players into new roles. Christen Press has found it difficult to get time as a central striker, where she performs best, but earned plenty of minutes on the wings. Crystal Dunn has gone from fullback to center forward to Number 10 to winger. Allie Long was used as a center back. Kelley O’Hara deployed as a fullback. Becky Sauerbrunn as a holding midfielder. Lindsey Horan as a 6, an 8, a 9. And so forth.

Over that time, there has been a constant barrage of criticism, much of it fair. It has often seemed like her primary motivation has been to pack the lineup with your ‘best’ players, rather than a desire to construct an XI with balance and mutually-supportive strengths. And you can understand the urge. Soccer is a game of skill, and the very best players will always be the most skillful ones. To some extent, you want to get as many of those players on the pitch as possible. But soccer is also a game of strength, athleticism, aggression, and insight. Not every player can excel at everything. A good team needs players who will work together to lift each other up. And that means that sometimes a specialist is more valuable than a superstar.

So there is good reason to approach every attempt to shift a player into a new position with a healthy dose of skepticism. 

 

From center mid to center back

Consider two players that have recently transitioned from the central midfield to center back. In 2015, Yael Averbuch made the shift for FC Kansas City, a move inspired largely by roster shortages related to the World Cup. But it wasn’t purely an act of desperation. Averbuch is a smart player, tall, and physical. There was some reason to think that she’d be able to handle the demands of the position. And there was also some hope that the qualities which made her a standout midfielder wouldn’t be wasted in the role. And that’s more or less what we’ve seen. There was a learning curve, but the move has to be considered a success.

Then there’s the case of Allie Long, a stalwart in the Portland midfield over the years, who was shifted to the backline by Ellis last fall in her experiments with a back three. Superficially, the two cases are somewhat similar. Long has also had success in a holding midfield role, is good in the air, and Ellis believed that her strength in distribution would make her ideal for the ‘libero’ role. However, it quickly became apparent that Long was quite limited defensively, not just in physical ability but also in her positioning and vision, and wasn’t really able to serve as the ‘quarterback’ that Ellis had hoped she might be. Moreover, it also became clear that Ellis’s entire vision for the back three was undercooked (to put it gently), with no real sense of how this formation would solve any of the team’s actual problems. Ultimately, the Ellis back three experiment seems to have been the ne plus ultra of her efforts to jam as many ‘skill’ players onto the pitch as possible, rather than reflecting a sustained effort to organize a balanced team.

So these are two cases, with some similarities, but very different results. And that’s partly just the nature of experiments. Some work, some don’t. Look around the NWSL and you’ll see plenty more examples. Kristen Edmonds has done well after being shifted to fullback, while players like Midge Purce, Jamia Fields, and Rachel Daly have been far less successful there. Amber Brooks has been a solid center back. Christina Gibbons has looked excellent after moving into the central midfield. And so forth.

Some moves seem doomed right from the start. And some are so obvious that you wonder why the shift didn’t happen years ago. But quite often you just need to play it out and see. But even in those cases, it’s not like this is completely random. Some moves are more likely to work than others, and there are some principles that help explain the differences. 

First: positions are real, and they require different strengths. To some extent, this is so obvious that it hardly bears saying. Defenders need to be better at defending. They don’t need to be as good on the ball. Pace is good everywhere, but it’s less critical in the central defense and more important on the wings. Skill at possession in tight quarters is good everywhere, but far more important in the central midfield and in the attack. No matter how good a player is, if you’re asking them to work a shift that requires skills they don’t have, they’re going to struggle. That’s not rocket science.

However, the second principle goes the other direction: positions are a lot more flexible than we sometimes think. Pace is critical for fullbacks, except when it isn’t. The modern attacking fullback is all about running, but it doesn’t have to be that way. If you’re willing to restructure your offense, you can get away with four lumbering center backs on your backline. A target forward should be good in the air, but not every forward is a target forward. You can succeed with a lone striker who is five-foot-nothing if you emphasize possession and silky through-balls and deemphasize long balls and crosses into the box. So long as you have a specific objective in mind—and aren’t just trying to jam a square peg into a round hole—using a ‘non-traditional’ player in a role can be quite successful.

Just as one example: there are few things more obvious than the idea that left-footed players should play on the left. But just look at how successful many teams have been in recent years with inverted wingers. All it takes is a slight shift in expectations for the job, and you can extract a great deal of value.

Third, communication is crucial. Most players have a ton of soccer IQ. It’s very hard to succeed in any position at the top levels without it. And given time, they’ll probably pick up the basic skills for a new position. But it won’t be seamless. You see this all the time with players who have grown up in ‘skill’ positions, who are used to taking risks and like to look for the next pass, and then get shifted back into defensive roles. They often get caught in possession when they could have simply cleared the ball into the stands; they attempt risky tackles without cover; they make dangerous passes across the face of goal. Coaching can’t fix those problems immediately—old instincts die hard, after all—but good communication about responsibilities will certainly help manage the danger.

Fourth, and finally, soccer isn’t just about skill … but skill is really important. And the same goes for athleticism. As I noted above, the impulse to simply jam as many skillful players onto the pitch is a bad one, and when that is your overriding impulse, you’re going to get unbalanced and unworkable teams. That said, while every position does have its own unique demands and requirements, there are still some universals. Pace plays anywhere. Skill on the ball plays anywhere. Field vision plays anywhere. And the simple reality is that the best players in the game play in the skill positions. After all, virtually everyone who makes it to the professional level used to be a forward. Players tend to shift down the defensive spectrum as they advance through the ranks. When the pond gets bigger and the number of roles decline, only the very best stay in the attacking spots. Those forward positions are the ones where individual skill matters most, while defense is more of a team endeavor and therefore depends less heavily on the singular talents of one superstar.

There are, of course, plenty of exceptions to the rule. And none of this is meant to minimize the specific demands of other positions. And not every player can manage the transition. Some of the best attackers in the world would be mediocre defenders. But as a general practice, you’re likely to find more success moving a player down the defensive spectrum than the other way around.

 

Sofia Huerta: fullback?

All of which brings me to the recent news out of the USWNT camp: that Ellis has been experimenting with Sofia Huerta in a fullback role.

This announcement provoked the usual consternation and outrage (including some from yours truly). And on its face, it does feel a little absurd. Huerta has found a lot of success as an attacker for Chicago but has shown little evidence of any special defensive strengths. Is the US so short on actual right backs that they’re going to try to forcibly convert a forward?

But there really is a coherent logic to the idea. The simple fact is that the US is stacked up top. Huerta is an excellent player, and almost any nation in the world would be desperate to have her. But she might well be a dozen slots deep in the depth chart for the US. It’s certainly not impossible to imagine her playing herself onto the team in that role, but it’s probably not the most likely scenario.

Meanwhile, when it comes to right back, the US provisions are far more limited. If the World Cup started this fall, Kelley O’Hara would probably be the first choice starter. But, of course, O’Hara herself isn’t really a ‘fullback’ by nature. Taylor Smith showed nicely in the Tournament of Nations, but still has a lot to prove, while Ali Krieger still has plenty in the tank but doesn’t seem to figure prominently in Ellis’s future plans. After that, there are a few names that pop up: Erica Skroski, Arin Gilliland, etc. All of whom are good players, and certainly wouldn’t be a disaster in the role. But these are not the sort of world-beaters that the US can deploy at most other positions.

The Gilliland comparison is particularly useful here since she and Huerta share the same club team. And why would you call in a Chicago forward rather than calling in the actual Chicago right back? But this gets back to the fourth principle listed above. Chicago uses Huerta as an attacker because they need her there. But the USWNT, stocked with players like Mallory Pugh, Crystal Dunn, Alex Morgan, Christen Press, and the like, doesn’t need Huerta anywhere.

Now, it’s quite possible that Huerta won’t translate well to a defensive role. And it’s also possible that we’ll never hear anything about this particular move again. But that wouldn’t prove it was a terrible idea per se. The US doesn’t lose much by testing out the waters, and if Huerta did take to the role well, there’s some real room for gain.

With all that in mind, I actually suggested precisely this move on an episode of the 123rd Minute podcast back in June. I didn’t specifically name Huerta (I was actually thinking of Shea Groom at the time), but the concept is the same.

Square pegs don’t fit well into round holes, it’s true. But soccer players aren’t pegs. They are flexible, adaptable human beings. And we simply have too many examples of players shifting into new (occasionally unconventional) roles and flourishing to reject this sort of thing out of hand. In the end, these sorts of moves need to be assessed based on individual ability and contextual need, not prejudged based on a fixed view of the right way to build a team.

Route Two Soccer – Washington Keeps It Simple, Get Results

Posted on by RJ Allen

Washington squared off against Houston this weekend in a matchup between the two bottom teams in the table, and in many ways that’s precisely what the game felt like. Neither team looked particularly confident in possession, both suffered awkward defensive breakdowns, and the play was often more than a little sloppy. However, there were also some important signs of life, particularly from the Washington side.

Dueling 4-3-3s, but very different approaches

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Washington came out in a fairly standard 4-3-3, with the only twist being the lack of a true central player in the forward line. Arielle Ship was nominally deployed as the central striker but drifted back and to the wings as much as she stayed in the middle. To the extent that the Spirit had anyone consistently in that central attacking zone, it was due to Kristie Mewis pushing forward.

The result was a very contained approach, with all eleven players taking on meaningful defensive responsibilities, and generally looking to strike on the counter more than to build out of the back.

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On the other side, Houston also employed a 4-3-3, as they have used most of this season. However, with new interim coach Morales at the helm, there were some changes. Once again, they experienced a major shuffle in the backline, with Amber Brooks being dropped from the holding midfield role to serve as center back, paired with Cari Roccaro, and flanked by Levin and Daly.

Presumably, these moves were designed to bolster Houston’s midfield, allowing Brian to play the holding role, creating space for both Andressa and O’Sullivan to join her. It’s an idea that makes some sense in theory—bring in more skillful attacking players to link play with the forward line and maintain possession—but which did very little to address their underlying problems.

Washington in 2017: defensive woes

The Spirit’s game plan was quite simple, but also fairly effective. Stay behind the ball in numbers, apply aggressive pressure once the opponent enters your half, and let your forwards break with pace when the chance comes. There have been teams playing like this for almost as long as there has been a game of soccer, and there’s a reason why it’s never truly gone out of style: it’s devilishly effective.

Going into the season, Washington’s strength looked like its backline, which had been quite stingy in their run to the final last year and which was returning with most of its key players. However, the defense has been anything but solid, conceding sixteen goals so far (most in the league).

The real question is whether those failures are primarily the fault of the backline, or whether responsibility needs to be shared more widely. And here the answer is clear: the blame needs to be spread around. The key to Washington’s team defense last year was the way it began from the front. They swarmed high up the pitch, closing tight on the ball to limit time for decision-making, closing down passing lanes, and generally making it difficult to play. And that is where Washington has really suffered this year. Losing the likes of Crystal Dunn, Joanna Lohman, Christine Nairn, and Diana Matheson—all two-way players with the intelligence and experience to work in combination—has made it extremely difficult for them to recover that defensive solidity. And in potentially the biggest blow, they’ve been forced to go without Tori Huster—one of the best defensive midfielders in the game today—since early May.

Coach Jim Gabarra has tried a number of different approaches to compensate, some more effective than others. At times, their deep-defending 3-5-2 has looked effective, but it’s not clear that they have enough quality in central midfield to take advantage of the numbers that it offers there. There is potential there, but so far it’s been a mixed bag at best.

A simple approach: defend in numbers, and let Pugh hit them on the break

But against Houston this weekend, the team finally looked a bit more like their 2016 selves. Not on the attacking side, where smooth passing, confident possession, and creative interplay continues to remain a distant memory. But defensively, this was a far more coherent team performance. From a team that has looked disjointed and more than a little frustrated at times this year, it was a breath of fresh air to see them defending as a unit. Havana Solaun and Meggie Dougherty Howard deserve special acclaim. Neither really fits the mold of a true holding player, but they worked together to close down Houston’s midfield—taking advantage of some relatively lax refereeing to establish a disruptive physical presence.

Meanwhile, the team’s discipline—keeping plenty of numbers back consistently—gave the center backs a bit more freedom to push forward without as much fear of leaving holes behind them. All of this allowed Washington to create a reasonably condensed field—packing the defensive third and stepping out to pressure the ball once it got close. That left Houston with plenty of possession, but also plenty of turnovers from their unsuccessful attempts to pick the lock. And those turnovers were deadly.

This was Mallory Pugh’s third game with the team, but the first time when they took full advantage of her presence. Her blistering pace and skill on the ball was enough to rip Houston apart on the counter and was the clear difference-maker in the game. Washington has other talented attackers, ones who can play the same role on occasion (Ordega, in particular, showed her ability against Sky Blue earlier this year), but none have the consistency or skill of Pugh. Without Pugh, Washington’s approach would be effective but all-too-predictable. With her, even when you know what’s coming, it’s difficult to avoid getting caught out.

It worked against Houston, but …

However, it’s important not to overstate the case. Washington earned a deserved victory on Saturday. They had a clear game plan and executed it well. And it’s certainly a replicable model. After all, a well-organized defense and lightning counters can beat any team in the league on its day.

But it was particularly well-suited for Houston. As mentioned, this was a team with a new (and agonizingly slow) center back pairing, which was hoping to control the midfield with relatively small numbers. And in order to make that plan work, they needed to ask quite a bit of Morgan Brian—who was tasked with occupying the holding midfield role and with pressing forward in the attack. It’s not that Brian can’t do both (indeed, she had her best game of the season), it’s simply that without a second skilled defender in the central midfield, there was no one left to shield the backline from the inevitable counters.

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Given that setup, this Washington approach was perfectly suited. And even with that being the case, it’s hardly like they shut Houston down entirely. Brian and Andressa both picked out some excellent passes, and both Ohai and Beckie found themselves with plenty of solid chances. And while Washington was quite successful at holding a rigid backline and relying on the offside trap to aggressively compress the field, they were only a few inches from getting caught on several occasions.

Against a better team—with an offense more in-sync and a backline with more pace and skill—Washington might have been in trouble.

So it would be a mistake for them to simply rest on their laurels here. Still, this was an incredibly important proof-of-concept game. It showed that they have a good sense of what Mallory Pugh brings to the team, and the ability to capitalize on it. It gave the team a win and lifted them off the bottom of the table going into the international break—which should also do wonders for team confidence and cohesion.

And with the likely return of Huster once the season starts back up in two weeks, there’s every reason to think that Washington can improve on the general model exhibited here. A bona fide defensive all-star guarding the backline should give everyone else a bit more space to press higher, and allow the Spirit to build back toward the sort of all-encompassing defensive unit that they were last year.

Washington still seems like an extreme longshot to make the playoffs—there are just too many unseasoned players in key positions here to achieve the kind of consistency that would require—but this is a respectable team and a far cry from the disaster that many were predicting a few months ago.

Route Two Soccer – Orlando is Making Progress

Posted on by RJ Allen

When the news came on Monday that Houston and Randy Waldrum had parted ways, it felt like a logical move. The calls for his dismissal had grown louder (including a long Twitter rant from yours truly last week), and it was increasingly hard to see a path forward for the team under Waldrum.

The question now is whether any of the other NWSL stragglers might soon find themselves in the same position. And the name that tends to dominate those conversations is Tom Sermanni. Like Houston, Orlando is an expansion team. And like Waldrum, Sermanni is a highly regarded coach who will probably get some cushion. That said, it’s hard to imagine Orlando giving him the same kind of extended leash that was handed to Waldrum. They did not sign Marta in order to have her languish at the bottom of the league all season.

At the moment, Orlando sit in 8th place with six points from seven games. That is not good, but in a league with this sort of parity, it also means they’re only a couple strong results away from being back in the thick of the playoff race. So while you never want to ignore the table, the question is less about results per se and more: “are they making progress?”

And on that front, my answer is a (tentative) yes. Orlando haven’t fixed their problems, but they do seem to be moving in the right direction.

Orlando’s weaknesses

In order to make that case, I want to first diagnose what I see as Orlando three main weaknesses, in order to clarify how they’re trying to resolve these problems.

  1. The midfield (or lack thereof)

This is, by far, the biggest problem for Orlando – something that was readily apparent before the season started, and which remains just as clear today. The Pride have plenty of useful players in the midfield–who can pass the ball reasonably well, who are somewhat mobile, with some decent defensive skill. But there aren’t really any standouts.

At times, Camila has looked like an exception—willing to take on defenders, and demonstrating some flashes of brilliance. But she is also prone to mistakes and doesn’t really have the cool, calm sort of ball control needed to keep the engine humming. And Kristen Edmonds was excellent in 2016 but was probably playing at her peak then, so it is no surprise to see her drift back into merely being a solid contributor. Combine these with Maddy Evans, Dani Weatherholt, and Monica, and you have a nice set of complementary parts but no one to tie it all together.

This isn’t necessary a death knell. It’s possible to cobble together a workable midfield from less, but it takes some real doing. And it’s a problem Orlando hasn’t solved yet.

  1. Finishing

On the whole, finishing tends to even out. Create enough chances, and the goals will follow. It can be frustrating to watch a team unable to convert, but over the long haul, if you’re giving your strikers opportunities, the results will follow. But Orlando are really putting that maxim to the test this year. We don’t have the sort of advanced statistics necessary to really compare teams, but my gut tells me that Orlando has one of the worst Goals vs. Expected Goals ratios in the league. The chances have been there; the finishing has not.

It’s possible that’s simply bad luck. But it’s also possible that it’s a problem of roster construction. After all, look at the teamsheet and you’ll find a group of forwards with immense skill and physical ability, who nevertheless haven’t been able to really make it stick at this level. Chioma Ubogagu, Jasmyne Spencer, Jamia Fields, Danica Evans … this is a Who’s Who of talented players who haven’t quite been able to put it all together yet.

You can’t help but wonder, therefore, whether Orlando might be in much better position if Alex Morgan hadn’t spent the last two months in France. Turn just a couple of those frustrating misses into goals, and Orlando could easily be sitting on 10 or 11 points and the season would feel a lot different.

  1. The defense

Going into the year, the backline was supposed to be Orlando’s greatest strength. Filled with top level internationals like Steph Catley, Alanna Kennedy, Ali Krieger, and Laura Alleway, this was expected to be the foundation stone upon which the team could build. But so far, it’s looked anything but solid. Orlando has yet to produce a clean sheet and has conceded 11 goals. Only Houston and Washington have let in more.

Stalwart defenders like Krieger and Alleway have looked shaky at times. Kennedy sometimes appears stuck in second gear. And even Catley—one of the world’s best fullbacks—has been below her normal level. In fact, their best defender so far has probably been Toni Pressley—who wasn’t even penciled in as a starter two months ago.

Addressing the weaknesses, or: Why on earth are they playing a 4-3-3?

These problems are real – especially the first two – and they are why I never really bought the idea that Orlando was a playoff challenger going into the season.

Still, every team in the league has weaknesses. The question is how they manage them. And this is where the questions about Sermanni really come to a head. Because he seems to be, somewhat inexplicably, committed to playing an attacking 4-3-3.

The exact composition has shifted a lot, but the preferred midfield trio seems to be Monica, Edmonds, and Camila. In the attack, things have been even more fluid, with the only constant presence being Marta. But their talisman has been shifted all across the frontline, playing everything from inside forward to winger to central striker to a traditional Number 10 role. You get the sense, actually, that Sermanni is just giving everything a try, hoping to figure out which role will give Marta the greatest chance to influence games and to figure out which players serve as the most useful complements to their new star.

But this can feel at times like re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. No matter how you set up Marta, there are structural limits to what they can get out of a 4-3-3, with this sort of personnel. Given the intrinsic weakness of the midfield, it feels borderline malpractice to set them up with a numerical deficiency like this. Time after time, Orlando has struggled to keep a grip on the game, while teams with four and five players in the midfield have swarmed them defensively and run right through them in the attack.

And losing the battle in the middle of the pitch has knock-on effects everywhere else. Indeed, if you want an explanation for Orlando’s defensive woes, this is the first place to look. I tweeted a couple examples of the problem last week:

 

Defense is a team effort. The pocket of space between the back four and the midfield is arguably the single most important zone on the pitch. Good attackers make their living by moving in and out of that space. If the defense stays put, you are free to operate at will. If they come out, it creates holes into which your teammates can move. Good defensive teams are good because they manage this space well. And with Orlando’s 4-3-3, they simply haven’t been able to do that this year.

Sky Blue 2 – 1 Orlando: Another frustrating result

We saw all this playing out again this week, as Orlando suffered another frustrating defeat away at Sky Blue. Watch Sky Blue’s first goal, for example, and it’s clear that it stems from a lack of numbers in the midfield. A poor touch sends the ball loose and neither Edmonds nor Camila have the requisite skill or strength to recover it. Then, once the ball is lost, there’s no support behind them, and Sky Blue has numbers in transition. Just a few seconds later, the ball is in the net and Orlando’s lead is gone.

Or: watch from 37:00 to about 38:15, and you’ll see Orlando’s defenders calmly passing the ball back and forth with their keeper while Sky Blue sits and watches. It’s almost a caricature of soccer (as in the classic Simpsons episode). Literally nothing happens because Orlando’s midfielders runners … well … aren’t, and there’s nowhere for the ball to go. It’s a stagnant offense and Sky Blue is justifiably willing to let them pass it horizontally.

So there are still real problems here.

Signs of life, or: Maybe the 4-3-3 can work after all?

However, for all that the 4-3-3 feels like an error, there are ways to compensate.

Your best hope is to develop a support structure that links together the midfield with the attacking trio. For example, as I wrote when discussing Houston a few weeks ago, the 4-3-3 is a very close cousin of the 4-2-3-1, when your wingers drop into the midfield without the ball, the transition can be almost seamless. Alternatively, if your central striker is a good playmaker, she can drop into the midfield and create a de facto 4-4-2 diamond. This is something that you see a lot from Christine Sinclair, who lets her flanking strikers pinch in as she drops back to receive the ball, giving her excellent angles to distribute the ball sideways to the overlapping fullbacks.

The problem for Orlando has been a lack of clarity on how they’re trying to compensate. But increasingly it seems that the most effective setup is to deploy Marta centrally, allowing her the freedom to roam in the empty expanses of the middle of the pitch. Rather than looking to work a bunch of clever midfield triangles, Orlando seems to be moving toward a version of the 4-3-3 that more closely resembles a coiled spring. Hold the ball patiently at the back, work it to the sides, and then pounce when the opportunity arises.

It’s by no means ticking along perfectly yet, but this is a viable model for the Pride. And it represents a somewhat clever inversion of the conventional wisdom. As I said, when I looked at this team in the first month of the season, it seemed crazy to stick with a midfield three when this was already a point of weakness. It was doubling down on a problem.

But in a certain sense, it actually makes a lot of sense. Orlando simply isn’t going to win a pitched midfield battle, no matter how they set themselves up. So rather than tilting at windmills, they’re looking to capitalize on their great comparative advantage: Marta. Yes, she’s not (quite) as good as she was five or six years ago. But she is still one of the best players in the world and is particularly good at holding the ball under pressure, wriggling out from double and triple teams, splitting defenses, and picking out open teammates on the run.

In this iteration of Orlando’s 4-3-3, she’s finally been given the freedom to play that role to the hilt. The goal is now quite simple: get Marta the ball 40-50 yards out, force the defense to converge on her, and let the rest of the attack build out from there. This setup lets the midfield hang further back, and provide a bit more defensive cover while trusting the fullbacks to shoulder more of the burden in linking play going forward.

And if you go back to that section I mentioned above, from the 38th minute, where Orlando shuffled the ball around aimlessly with no outlets, you can see precisely how this is all supposed to work. Because yes, that minute was terrible, but look what happens right after. At 38:19, Krieger plays a long ball forward, which draws Freeman out from the Sky Blue backline. When the ball falls in behind her, Freeman’s step forward creates space for Marta to move into. She takes the ball, evades a tackle, and crashes into the box. A nice recovery from Killion snuffs out the attack before she can shoot, but the movement here is a good sign.

Sermanni has a plan – it’s worth giving him time to see it out

Orlando remains very much a work in progress. And the glimmers of hope I have discussed here are just that: glimmers. Things may very well not work out. Orlando has a lot of talent on their roster, but so does every team in the league. Even if they play reasonably well going forward, they could easily still end up finishing 7th or 8th. But the crucial difference between Orlando and Houston is that the Pride can tell a coherent story about how they are improving and what success will look like.

Ultimately, it wasn’t the results per se that necessitated Waldrum’s dismissal. It was the realization that the team was at best just treading water. For whatever reason, Waldrum wasn’t able to acknowledge and/or address the clear shortcomings of his team. The same does not appear to be true for Sermanni. His approach won’t succeed. But he does have an approach. And in my opinion, he deserves the time to see it through.

Route Two Soccer – Chicago 2 – 0 Houston: How to Control a Midfield

Posted on by RJ Allen

With Ertz in the holding role, Press dropping back, and the fullbacks ranging forward, Chicago overloaded the midfield and dominated the game.

After suffering a 2-0 defeat away to Houston to open the season, Chicago fared far better in week 4, producing a suffocating performance that allowed them to reverse the scoreline and earn an easy three points.

Now, controlling the game against Houston is not particularly difficult at the moment—given their weakness in the midfield—and Chicago absolutely should expect to beat them at home. Still, there’s a world of difference between expectation and reality. It’s a credit to Rory Dames and his team that they were able to diagnose Houston’s primary weakness and set themselves up to capitalize.

Chicago has been a bit of a tactical enigma so far in 2017. They’re a team with a lot of options and a stated desire to develop a range of styles and setups. In her Unsung Hero column this week, Jacqui Porter noted that Chicago’s defenders have embraced the idea of flexible deployment, with everyone potentially ready to slot into a variety of roles on a given day. And the big news for the Red Stars this year, of course, has been the varied uses of Julie Ertz—who has jumped from center back to attacking midfielder to holding midfielder just in the course of these few games.

But for all that talk, the reality is that Chicago has done very little to move away from their standard approach: a 4-4-2 midfield diamond, with pinched wingers and overlapping fullbacks. Yes, when Chicago was chasing the game at Portland in week 3, they briefly switched to a back three. But on the whole, the basic setup has remained the same. Whatever shifts they’ve tried have mostly happened within that framework—with the same names simply swapping places within the diamond.

That does produce some genuine unpredictability. After all, the 4-4-2 may look the same on paper but it will play quite differently depending on who occupies the spot at the top of the diamond. With Ertz there, you get very little playmaking through the middle, as she focuses more on crashing the box and using her physicality to force play directly down the defense’s throat. With Press, the approach is far more technical and dynamic—with the associated cost of drawing their best scorer away from the goal.

An attacking diamond: capitalizing on Houston’s weakness

On Saturday, though, we saw a third variant—and one that produced a lot of positive results. This time, DiBernardo took the attacking midfield slot, giving Press the freedom to push forward into a withdraw forward role, and allowing two of the team’s most skillful and perceptive players to work together in the attacking corridor. And although she didn’t produce her best game this time around, DiBernardo has the potential to be a true #10 (one of the very few in the US player pool who can make that claim). In the long term, using her front and center could pay enormous dividends for Chicago. 

Meanwhile, Ertz was pushed back to the holding midfield role and Colaprico sent to the left, with Mautz mirroring her on the right.

This setup maximizes the team’s offensive capacity—giving each of the front six room to express themselves and encouraging good build up through the middle. It does, however, come with some drawbacks. First, while Colaprico is certainly capable of playing on the left, it is a bit of a waste of her talents. She is arguably the best holding midfielder in the league, and has less chance to control the game from the left. Second, while Ertz is an excellent defender, she is far less restrained positionally. Where Colaprico is a midfield conductor, keeping a firm hand on the play and easing smoothly on the throttle, Ertz is far more rambunctious—more a traditional box-to-box midfielder than a true holding player. Those forward runs can be devastating, of course, but they can also leave the backline exposed.

However, when executed well, these two dangers mostly cancel out. One of the advantages of using Colaprico on the left is her capacity to drop back to occupy that central holding space when needed–something that most wide players can’t be trusted to do. What’s more, Houston is precisely the sort of team to use this approach against. Given their midfield frailty, they simply can’t risk a high-pressure game in the midfield. That allows Chicago to dominate possession in that area, granting Ertz the freedom to playmake from the back and allowing the Red Stars to dictate the run of play.

At least, in theory, that’s what should happen.  But for the opening half hour, it didn’t look to be working all that well, with Colaprico making a number of very un-Colaprico like errors, and Ertz ranging out a bit too aggressively. However, the Chicago defense did its job—double and triple teaming Ohai to limit the damage, and giving the offense time to settle into their roles. During this period, Chicago was the better team, but still looked a bit out of sorts.

A tightening vice

As the game progressed, however, everything began to flow a bit more smoothly. And the key to it all was Christen Press, who remains goalless on the year, but has turned in some excellent performances nonetheless. Saturday was her best game of the season, and a big part of that is down to the flexibility that this setup affords her. As a slightly withdrawn, wandering forward, she is free to hang on the shoulder of the last defender one minute and then drop deep into the midfield to link play the next. Given her skill and confidence on the ball, the defense can’t afford to leave her unmarked as she flits between the midfield and the front line, but neither can any single player afford to stay with her indefinitely lest it fracture the team’s overall defensive shape. 

It was a problem that Houston was never able to solve. Time and time again, Press would drift back, overloading the Houston midfield, and allowing quick transitions through the middle. Then, as Houston would push their backline higher in an effort to close down all that free space, she and Huerta would race through and take a ball over the top from Colaprico, Ertz, DiBernardo, or the fullbacks. Press, in particular, found plenty of joy down the left channel. Some excellent defending (from Roccaro in particular) kept those assaults from turning into goals, but it was a constant threat on the day.

Both Ohai and Daly worked hard to contribute defensively, in the hope of rebalancing the numbers, but their efforts were more sound and fury than they were a tactical success. The crucial danger zone for Houston was that pocket of space between Chicago’s midfield and front line, and for all that their forwards put in good shifts to race back and defend, they were mostly trailing behind the play—looking to provide cover after the seam had already been split. 

Morgan Brian – very good, but is it enough?

Things did change in the final twenty minutes, due largely to the season debut from Morgan Brian. With her on the pitch, Houston looked a different team, far more confident in possession, and far more resolute in the midfield. It just goes to show how much they’ve missed her (and Andressa) over the last few games. Still, even with that jolt of energy and additional skill, Houston didn’t really resolve the underlying problems; they simply managed to play around them a bit more successfully.

So, going forward, even if Brian is ready to play 90 minutes every week, it remains to be seen whether they can develop an approach that will capitalize on the extra bit of stability she can bring. Because even with Brian at her peak (and Brian at her peak is one of the world’s best players), Houston will still face the underlying problem of a defense that is excellent when defending deep, or when coming out, but which all too easily gets twisted and turned the higher up the pitch they go. All of which goes to the point I made a few weeks ago: for the Dash, the best bet is likely to defend deep—‘solving’ the problem of an overloaded midfield by simply conceding the point—draw the opposition forward, and look to spring them through a quick counterattack. So far, the team has shown flashes but little sense of a real desire to play that way. One of the big questions going forward is whether Waldrum is willing to make that commitment. And if not, whether he’ll come up with a solution to this persistent problem.

Route Two Soccer – Sky Blue 1 – 0 FCKC: Vlatko Struggles to Compensate For the Loss of Rodriguez

Posted on by RJ Allen

FC Kansas City entered 2017 with high hopes. With both Amy Rodriguez and Sydney Leroux returning from pregnancy, the biggest problem with the 2016 squad—a lack of goals—looked settled. And for the first hour, everything seemed to be going according to plan. But from the moment Rodriguez went down with an ACL injury, KC’s 2017 success was put in doubt.

There are few players in the league more crucial to their team’s chances than Rodriguez, whose ability to play the central striker in a front three was the linchpin of the team’s whole setup. Without her, the goals have dried up as Vlatko Andonovski has struggled to pull together the pieces into a viable lineup.

The problem isn’t necessarily a lack of attacking talent. While Sydney Leroux does not seem fully back to match fitness after her own return from pregnancy, she’s looked lively enough. And although Shea Groom missed this weekend’s match against Sky Blue due to a rib injury, she should be back soon. The deeper problem, though, is that for all that Leroux and Groom are excellent strikers, both do better in a supporting role, as a slashing attacker arriving from the wings or from a deeper-lying position. Without a player like Rodriguez to lead the line, neither will flourish to their full potential.

This problem is compounded by a deep weakness in the midfield, with Mandy Laddish out for the first several months due to injury and Erica Tymrak either injured or out-of-favor. Those absences combine to produce an enormous hole in the attacking spine.

A forced return to the 4-2-3-1

The weakness in the central midfield wouldn’t have been a huge problem if KC could play in their preferred 4-3-3—which uses Rodriguez as the fulcrum of buildup through the center, while pushing much of the attacking movement out toward the wingers and fullbacks. But having lost that player who could link the lines, Andonovski moved back to last year’s 4-2-3-1 against Sky Blue this weekend.

The shift makes sense, particularly given the absence of Groom and the return of Desiree Scott. Anticipating a lack of goals, Vlatko wisely chose to bolster the midfield, deploying Scott and LaBonta to disrupt play and hold possession against the press. Using two holding players would also help to fill gaps and prevent the defense from being broken apart by Sky Blue’s fluid attacking structure (with Kelley O’Hara’s movement producing constant micro-tactical shifts throughout the match).

And it basically worked. Sky Blue found little space in the final third, and were mostly stifled on the night. For all the possession they held, there were very few genuinely dangerous attacking moves.

But the move didn’t come without costs. And the problem with their 4-2-3-1 is as simple as it is unsolvable: Sydney Leroux simply isn’t well-utilized as a lone forward. Her best qualities are her slashing runs, her physicality, and her intelligent movement off the ball. In those departments, she is world class. But with her back to goal, attempting to link up with an understaffed attacking midfield behind her, not so much. She certainly put in the work last night, but just isn’t a consistent enough player to really excel in the role.

And while the two holding midfielders both performed well, the same can’t be said about the attacking trio. On the right, Katie Bowen was good at times, demonstrating an awareness of space and anticipation of movement, but looked a bit sluggish in transition. The quality is there, but she’ll need more support around her. In the center, Maegan Kelly did her best but simply looked outclassed. She is a useful player, but simply doesn’t have enough skill on the ball to orchestrate the central midfield of a playoff hopeful. And on the left, Brittany Ratcliffe was tireless and aggressive and managed to get behind the defense a few times in nice slashing runs. But (as with Kelly) the final quality was simply a cut below what is needed to sustain a viable attack from such a short-staffed unit.

Both Kelly and Ratcliffe are good players and certainly can contribute for KC this season in supporting roles. But neither made the initial roster—each being added only a few days before the season to cover for injuries—and there’s a reason for that. That also means that (in just the third week of the season) fully 50% of KC’s attacking quartet started the season off the roster. That’s not a recipe for many goals.

Sky Blue’s weak backline, and KC’s difficulties exploiting it

With Christie Pearce out, the oldest player in Sky Blue’s back five Sunday night was Erica Skroski, who just turned 23 and was being played out of position as a center back. While there is enormous talent there, it’s also a unit that was ripe for exploitation. And in fact, under modest pressure, they lost the ball far more often than Christy Holly will have liked to see (including a misplaced pass from Sheridan that Ratcliffe pounced on and sent forward to Leroux who put the ball in the net—only to be called offside). But given their setup, and the need to keep numbers back in defense, KC simply couldn’t afford to press aggressively.

Moreover, given Leroux’s limitations in transition, they also found little success in quick transitional counterattacks—another missed opportunity.

Still, KC’s attack wasn’t completely helpless. They seem to have diagnosed two other potential weaknesses in the Sky Blue defense and targeted them aggressively.

First, a tendency to get drawn forward and lose defensive structure. Mandy Freeman in particular likes to step forward to close down the ball, creating space behind her into which an attacker can run to receive a through ball or dinked pass over the top. With Pearce, or a player of her quality, on the backline, that space might have been less exploitable, but Skroski has several decades less experience and (understandably) failed to provide cover in every case. And KC certainly sought to attack this vulnerability. Leroux earned herself a golden chance in the opening minutes this way, but failed to get her foot through it, and her shot was easily saved. Then in the 36th minute, a lovely through ball from Kelly found an onrushing Ratcliffe who bundled her shot straight at the keeper.

Second, a lack of strength in the air. It’s not that Sky Blue is weak in this department, but they did suffer a few minor communication breakdowns and missed clearances—precisely the sort of thing you’d expect from a young defense. Christina Gibbons, in particular, delivered a few excellent crosses, one of which Ratcliffe put into the net only to have it (perhaps incorrectly) ruled offside, and another in the 42nd minute that Leroux just missed converting. And on a late corner, Sauerbrunn was left unmarked at the back post and almost scored.

So, on the one hand, there were some positives for Kansas City. They were held scoreless, yes, but they did put the ball in the net twice (even if neither counted) and produced a half dozen other good chances. On the other hand, they won’t face many defenses this year as inexperienced as Sky Blue’s on Sunday, and for all the chances they created, none of them produced a goal.

Is the 4-2-3-1 hopeless?

So what does this mean? Should KC abandon the 4-2-3-1? Not necessarily. After all, it does come with real advantages, and Leroux isn’t terrible in the role by any means. It’s certainly not her best usage, but she is talented enough to convert a limited set of chances into goals at a reasonable rate.

Moreover, once Groom returns, that might allow for a slightly more effective variation, bringing Bowen into the center in place of Kelly, and letting Groom rampage down the right flank. And once Laddish is back (and if Tymrak ever comes back into favor), they’ll have other decent options for that central role—allowing some additional flexibility.

Still, even at its best, given the available personnel the 4-2-3-1 will remain a basically conservative option: stifle the game, produce a few chances, and hope for a 1-0 victory. But against the stronger attacking teams in the league, that may not be enough, so they’ll need to consider other options.

One alternative would be to move to a 4-4-2 diamond, with Leroux and Groom as forwards, bringing the midfield in more tightly, and relying on the fullbacks for width. And over the course of the season, that might be their best setup. Gibbons has shown flashes of her excellent attacking qualities at left back (see the discussion of her crosses above) but has also looked raw in defense and prone to getting pulled out of position. So for now, it would probably be a mistake to put too many of the attacking eggs in her basket.

Given the solidity of their defense—with arguably the best back five in the league—and the ability to deploy two high-quality disruptors in the holding midfield role, FC Kansas City is going to be tough to beat this year. But if they can’t find a way to restore some voltage in the attack, they’ll find it difficult to score enough to really challenge for the playoffs.

Route Two Soccer – North Carolina 1-0 Portland: A Comprehensive Pressing Performance

Posted on by RJ Allen

It ended up a low-scoring affair—a bit of a disappointment after last year’s epic 4-3 semifinal—but this early match between two of the league’s title challengers offered plenty of excitement in its own right. It was defined by a virtuoso team defensive performance from North Carolina, whose comprehensive pressing game put Portland under pressure in every inch of the field, and set up their attack to pounce whenever the opportunity arose. In the end, it won them a late goal, three points, and sole possession of first place.

North Carolina switched to a back three for the game, bringing Abby Erceg into the center of the defense and pushing Kawamura and Dahlkemper to the left and right, respectively. That shift was risky, giving Portland the chance to try and isolate each of Carolina’s defenders, but it more than paid off. Despite a shaky day’s work from Kawamura, Portland was never able to find a way through. That was thanks largely to the swarming efforts of the upfield players, who shut down most attacks long before they had a chance to build.

It was a performance entirely appropriate to the new digs for the team—with this sort of athletic, tireless, hassling game being the longtime legacy of Anson Dorrance’s UNC. Not much flair or fancy passing moves; just brutal pace, aggressive play, and an attacking trio that was out for blood.

The three-back was key to the plans. By shifting the balance of the team forward, it let Paul Riley’s side engage a comprehensive and swarming counterpress. Portland’s backs spent the whole game under intense pressure, which severely limited outlet opportunities to even get the ball up to the midfield trio of Henry, Long, and Horan.

All too many times, Portland was denied passing lanes and ultimately forced into a speculative ball over the top, or into a risky sideways or backward pass. The former generally resulted in losing the ball upfield, while the latter produced more than a few turnovers in dangerous locations.

Amandine Henry is very good, but this sort of pressure is tough for anyone to deal with

And that’s precisely what led to the only goal of the match. Lacking a clear forward option, Portland passed all the way back to the keeper, allowing more NC players to enter their attacking half and further clog up the lanes. A poor pass was almost taken by Mewis, recovered by Long, who then found Sinclair near the center circle. Sinclair then dribbled backward through traffic, returned the ball to Long, who again passed backward into a space that ought to have been safe. Instead it was occupied by a waiting Lynn Williams, who passed to Zerboni, who sent it forward to McDonald, who found the arriving head of Debinha crashing into the box. It was a classic counterpress, executed with brute efficiency, against an exhausted Portland team.

Here is Long’s misplaced pass:

Quite clearly, Long did have options, but none were good. And the error is understandable, given the amount of pressure placed on her to that point. Constant play under stressful conditions leads to sloppiness, and it only takes one errant pass to turn the tide of the game.

Press high and foul aggressively

The pressing game is difficult to handle, particularly when used by a team with such physical and quick players, but it’s hardly foolproof. So North Carolina needed a Plan B for when Portland did wriggle free. And while part of that plan was to rely on the strength and skill of their defenders to avoid getting caught out when the press broke down, the heart of their approach was far simpler: commit fouls, early and often.

The ‘professional foul’ is named that way for a reason, and North Carolina was not shy about employing the tactic where necessary, to avert a dangerous breakaway. But the strategy works even better in the NWSL, where referees tend to call the games quite loosely, and are extremely hesitant to pull out their cards. As it was, North Carolina earned two bookings—one by Kawamura in the first half and another by Mewis in the second—both for precisely this sort of foul. But they will surely be perfectly happy to concede that modest cost in exchange for significantly limiting Portland’s run of play on the counterattack.

The problem of Adrianna Franch

Compounding Portland’s problems on the night was a severe lack of confidence in their keeper. Franch has looked shaky through the preseason and into the opening match, and that was no different in week 2. While she clearly has skill at controlling her box, at the moment she’s a trap waiting to go off with the ball at her feet. In the 24th minute, a weak kick put the ball right at the feet of Sam Mewis, and on a number of other occasions she looked shaky in her clearances.

Against a high press, the option to put the ball back to the keeper is vitally important. Without that ability, the range of play closes down radically, leaving at best a 180 degree field in which to work. With Portland clearly concerned about putting Franch under any sort of pressure, they were often left with an even more tightly constrained set of choices.

Franch is a talented keeper, and has never exhibited quite this range of problems with playing out of the back, so it’s possible this is something she’ll be able to work through. In the meantime, however, Portland is uniquely susceptible to this sort of approach.

The Portland response: long-delayed and mostly inadequate

North Carolina’s choice to employ a back three was slightly surprising, but it was a change more of degree than of kind. The overall setup was precisely what we’d expect from this team: athletic, tough, and aggressive. As such, you would expect Portland to have been prepared for a difficult midfield battle. The addition of an extra body in those channels might well have been surprising, but it shouldn’t have changed the game plan significantly.

And yet Portland seemed bewildered for most of the game, sticking with the same 4-3-3 right until the death. It was well into the second half before Henry began regularly dropping back into the backline to help maintain possession, but even then there was no meaningful shift in the overall setup. It meant that they got far too little mileage out of a world class midfield trio which, for all their skill in possession, was no match for the five or six bodies North Carolina regularly used to block and disrupt. 

There certainly are potential advantages to the 4-3-3 in this case. With three attackers and three defenders, a quick pass upfield creates the potential to isolate each defender and beat them with skill and/or pace. However, Portland made very little progress on this front, with a few notable exceptions down the right flank where Nadim was able to brush off Kawamura and find a good deal of space. None of those attacks ended up bearing fruit, but they suggested a strategy with potential.

Kawamura had a poor game, but Portland didn’t do enough to capitalize

The problem there was quite simple: for all her many talents, Nadim does not possess the sort of violent acceleration or the inclination to hang on her defender’s shoulder waiting to spring into action. Indeed, this is the great weakness of Portland’s whole attack. It’s not a slow group, but none of them are lightning attackers capable of exploiting an isolated defender left covering acres of space. They depend on buildup through the midfield to generate opportunities and unlock space for them to attack. And that’s precisely what North Carolina was denying on the night.

As such, it’s surprising that Portland didn’t shift gears. The 4-3-3 is a close cousin of the 4-2-3-1, and Portland could certainly have dropped back a bit, let Long and Henry settle into a double pivot, and bring the wingers back to the midfield to create a wider range of options in possession. Sinclair is arguably their most skillful player on the ball in tight quarters (at least until Tobin Heath returns), and could have worked very well as a target forward—drifting into the pocket between the back three and Carolina’s central midfield, holding up play, and creating space for the wingers to run into. She certainly was attempting to play that role, but no one else in the Portland side ever seemed to quite realize it.

Abby Dahlkemper is very good

It’s worth taking a moment to note just how good Dahlkemper was on the night. Virtually every meaningful Portland attack went down the other side—where Kawamura was shaky at times and could easily have set up a goal. On the left, though, Portland’s well ran almost completely dry.  That’s particularly surprising given that North Carolina’s right wingback (playing in front of Dahlkemper) was Makenzy Doniak, hardly a noted defender. But Dahlkemper was immense, keeping Mallory Weber and Hayley Raso in her pocket the whole night and even regularly stepping forward to clean up messes in the midfield before they could turn into full-blown crises. Erceg had a solid game as the central defender, but Dahlkemper was the star of the backline on the day.

The puzzle of Debinha

The North Carolina setup has been called a 3-5-2 by some, but in practice it played far closer to a 3-4-3, or perhaps a 3-4-1-2, with Debinha playing as something of an inside forward.

The Brazilian scored the goal, and has widely been hailed as a crucial addition to the North Carolina side. And she provides a useful change of pace from the rest of the squad. But she is certainly not a ‘Number 10’ as many have described her. For fans of the US Women’s National Team, she’s a very similar player to the late-period Carli Lloyd. While she is theoretically playing an attacking midfield role, she frequently wanders all over the pitch. This can create difficulties for a defense seeking to mark her, but also creates problem for a team depending on a defined organizational structure. Her play is mercurial and explosive, but also undisciplined and frustrating. 

For now, it seems, North Carolina has been able to use her as a luxury player, a roving attacker constantly keeping an eye on goal, who is ready to step into the space created after Williams and McDonald have torn a defensive line apart. And in that role, she certainly should be able to thrive. But it remains to be seen whether North Carolina will always be able to afford that luxury.

On Saturday, the exhaustive work from Zerboni and Mewis was enough to hold the central midfield line, allowing Debinha to venture off on her excursions. Against another opponent (or a Portland side armed with Tobin Heath), that might prove insufficient, and Debinha’s roving movement—not to mention her profligacy with possession—could prove quite damaging.

She is an important player, and a strong pickup for North Carolina, something made perfectly clear this weekend. But for all her strengths, there are important weaknesses here, too. It will be interesting to watch how future sides seek to exploit them, and how Paul Riley responds.

Route Two Soccer: The Counterattack and Houston’s 4-3-3

Posted on by RJ Allen

Welcome to Route Two Soccer, a new (semi) weekly column, where I’ll be discussing tactics in the women’s game.

There are plenty of great resources out there already on soccer tactics in general, and a whole lot more applying those concepts, but there’s not nearly as much available about tactical developments on the women’s side of things. I’m hoping to help fill in a little bit of that gap.

To kick things off this week, I want to talk about the Houston Dash, a team picked by many (including yours truly) to finish near the bottom of the table, who played this weekend without their two biggest stars (Carli Lloyd is in England until June and Morgan Brian carrying an injury), and nevertheless managed to secure a 2-0 victory over a strong Chicago side.

Despite the scoreline, it was a relatively even affair with Chicago arguably having the better of the game for the first 70 minutes. However, the manner in which Houston achieved the win deserves attention, since it has big implications for how the team will need to set up over the rest of the season if they hope to replicate this result.

Houston set up in a 4-3-3, led by an attacking triumvirate of Ohai, Daly, and Beckie—a group with the talent to be one of the best frontlines in the league. Ohai and Beckie were nominally positioned on the left and right respectively, but swapped sides easily over the course of the match. Daly mostly held the center, playing off the others, and trying to set the conditions for successful linkup play.

Houston’s 4-3-3: strengths and weaknesses

When it works, this sort of fluid attacking line creates enormous difficulties for the defense. All three are adept at picking off isolated defenders, dragging defenses out of position, and then slicing through the resulting spaces. Working together, they can trigger a cascading effect. As one creates a gap, the next moves through it to receive the ball, further dragging defenders off their mark and creating space for the third to gain a solid look on goal.

However, this approach has limitations as well. For one thing, it misses out on the advantages of a traditional center forward. While Daly can deputize as a #9, she lacks the physical presence to dominate in the air or allow for a game built around hold-up play. Moreover, this trio is chock full of great goals, but is far less adept at the sort of goal poaching that’s so often is necessary to grind out a tough win.

But most importantly, with all three forwards at their best facing goal and/or moving laterally, it can be difficult for Houston to orchestrate much buildup through the midfield. When it’s not working, this 4-3-3 leaves the attacking trio isolated, and the midfield overrun.

This effect is compounded by Houston’s relative dearth of good possession-oriented central midfielders. Andressa certainly fits that bill—with as much skill on the ball as almost anyone in the league—but Denise O’Sullivan and Amber Brooks do not. They both have excellent work rates, and can be trusted to put in a shift, but these are hardly the players to build a tiki-taka game around. Houston’s 4-3-3, therefore, can easily set up their opponent to dominate possession and choke off attacks before they begin, something that happened all too often last year (including an almost unbelievable scoreless run of 567 minutes).

In theory, this setup should be relatively flexible, shifting quickly back and forth between the 4-3-3 in attack to a 4-2-3-1 in defense (with Ohai and Beckie dropping back to the midfield, and O’Sullivan dropping back to form a bank of two defensive midfielders). However, neither of the wide attackers is particularly adept defensively, minimizing the value of this switch. And, even more importantly, the 4-2-3-1 is best suited for facilitating transitions through the center of the pitch, using the extra bodies in the midfield to support the attack. But this isn’t really Houston’s objective, and it remains to be seen whether they try to move more in that sort of direction.

Houston’s 4-3-3 in action – Week 1

On Saturday, we saw clear evidence of both the strengths and weaknesses of the 4-3-3.

On the negative side, Chicago’s excellent central diamond used their extra body and greater skill in possession to great effect, running circles around the beleaguered Houston midfield. Despite their best efforts, O’Sullivan and Brooks spent most of the first hour chasing shadows, giving dangerous players like DiBernardo, Colaprico, and Press far too much time and space on the ball. Meanwhile, Andressa spent a lot of time getting kicked, but didn’t find much joy threading needles through quickly collapsing spaces.

However, on the positive side, as Houston dropped deeper in defense Chicago was forced to come forward, leaving acres of space behind their defensive line. And this sort of expanse is precisely the terrain that Houston’s frontline is best suited to exploit.

You can see the effect quite clearly in Houston’s first goal. It all began with Chicago slicing open the Houston defense and then rattling the post with a shot. But in the space of just a few seconds, Brooks went from standing over the ball in her own defensive third (with five Chicago players behind her) to launching a ball over the top right to the feet of an onrushing Ohai, with only the keeper to beat. It was a ridiculously fast transition: from nearly conceding to putting the ball in the net in the space of 15 seconds.

And this is the issue for Houston in 2017. Their chief resources are blistering pace and skillful attackers who do best attacking head-on, taking defenders on directly, or rushing into space to meet a throughball. In that sense, they seem ideally suited to a counterattacking setup. However, Houston’s primary weakness is its backline, where none of their defenders are without significant questions. A strategy of resolute defending and lightning counterattacks might serve them well, but it could be exceptionally dangerous to sit back and wait for opponents to attack their weakest link.

The return of Lloyd and Brian

These questions will only grow as Lloyd and Brian return. Both are excellent players, of course, but it remains to be seen whether and how they can be fitted into a more successfully tactical setup.

Lloyd, in particular, is a real enigma. Her presence in 2016 coincided with (by far) the team’s best run of form. Consider: in Lloyd’s six full games, Houston scored 17 goals and earned 12 out of 18 points. In their other 14 games, Houston scored just 12 goals and earned only 10 out of 42 points. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether Lloyd actually fits into the system that Houston needs to play. She’s certainly not well suited for a lethal counterattacking unit built on pace and quick one-touch passing to slice through a defense in transition.

And if she does return to the Dash starting XI, whom would she replace? Sacrificing any of the midfielders would only exacerbate the defensive frailty. Losing one of the front three, however, would radically change the offensive structure—with Lloyd likely slotting in as more of an attacking midfielder at the top of a 4-4-2. We have seen Lloyd excel in that role before—when she is on her game, she truly fits the bill of the trequartista. But those games are rare in the best of times, and Lloyd is now solidly in her mid 30s. Can the Dash afford to build their entire offense around the gamble of getting Lloyd at her best?

What to do with Morgan Brian is an easier topic, though not without its own subtle concerns. Thanks to national team duties and a series of injuries, Brian has never quite achieved what the Dash hoped from her when they selected her with the #1 pick in 2015. But a healthy Morgan Brian is one of the most skillful and gifted (both physically and mentally) players in the world–the sort of player that any team can use.

So, looking forward, the question for the Dash is just how soon they’ll be able to get that version of Brian, and where they should use her once she becomes available. I’ve argued before over at Stars and Stripes FC that Brian’s best role going forward might be as a holding midfielder, in something of the Sergio Busquets role. That position maximizes the value of her skill on the ball, her field vision, and her control in tight spaces. However, if Houston plan to play a counterattacking game, they simply won’t have much use from a short-passing playmaker in the deep holding slot. It might make more sense, then, to continue slotting in Brooks at the #6—where she is more than serviceable—and swap out O’Sullivan instead.

For Houston, Brian’s value will probably be maximized if she plays as a box-to-box midfielder, dropping deep and effectively playing as the second piece of a double pivot when in defense—enhancing the midfield shield that will help to protect the frail backline—but with the freedom to range forward to link up with Andressa, Poliana and the attacking three when in possession. O’Sullivan did well enough in that role on Saturday, but there’s no denying that a fully fit Brian would make it easier for the Dash to shift fluidly between the 4-3-3 in attack and the 4-2-3-1 in defense.

If they’re able to integrate Brian into the system in that slot and if she and Andressa can form a solid relationship in those roles, it would significantly enhance Houston’s tactical versatility, and could be the difference between a successful campaign and another mediocre season.

Going forward

Houston performed well on Saturday, managing to play fairly even with a strong Chicago team, and start their season with three points. But the flaws of this roster were very much on display, and the real problem is: it’s not really clear that there are many solutions available.

The 4-3-3 is the best way to maximize the attacking abilities of their front six, but it’s a fairly rigid framework. When it works, it produces moments of magic. When it doesn’t, it produces a lot of frustration. And unlike other teams in the league, with enormous flexibility to rebalance their team on a given day, Houston doesn’t have a lot of other options.

As noted above, when Lloyd returns they may choose to shift to a 4-4-2 (pushing Ohai to the wings and using Lloyd as the #10), and they did have some success in this formation last year. But it relies heavily on getting top-quality performances from Lloyd (a risky gamble), and also risks seriously unbalancing the midfield.

Ultimately, it’s hard to look at the roster and not think that a trade might be their best option. At the end of the day, Houston’s season will be made or broken on the backline, and while they can and should work on drilling a bit more positional solidity into that backline, there’s a limit to how much water you can squeeze from a rock.

But Lloyd remains an incredibly dangerous player. Might not some other team in the league be willing to offer up some defensive support in order to get her? If it’s possible to bring in some additional strength from outside, they would be well advised to consider it.